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Abstract 
 
The course of regional integration in East Asia has been shaped by a complex mix if 
internal and external factors. Although the emergence of initiatives like ‘ASEAN Plus 
Three’ appears to indicate that East Asia is assuming a more independent and 
regionally-oriented place in the international system, this paper argues that the future 
trajectory of ASEAN Plus Three, and of the region more generally, will continue to be 
constrained by internal tensions and – especially – by the continuing influence of the 
United States. In short, for the foreseeable future East Asia will be marked by a form 
of ‘reactionary regionalism’ in which regional initiatives are designed to mediate and 
moderate external influences. 
 
******************** 
 
 
It has become something of a cliché to observe that supposedly ‘global’ processes are 
in fact marked by striking regional biases. While the economic and political 
manifestations of this phenomenon are most pronounced in the European Union (EU), 
greater integration and cooperation at a regional level has become a characteristic of 
contemporary transnational relations in the Americas and East Asia as well. In short, 
while we may be living in an era dominated by the idea of globalisation, the reality is 
that global forces are powerfully mediated by regional factors with the consequence 
that ‘globalisation’ looks very different in various parts of the world. 
 
This article is primarily concerned with the way in which the countries of East Asia 
have responded to this global-regional dialectic. Yet even to speak of ‘East Asia’ is to 
make a number of initial assumptions about the validity of what is arguably an 
arbitrary geographical demarcation, and about the possible existence of a regional 
identity that is, in itself, contestable and uncertain.1 For one of the most noteworthy 
characteristics of regionally-based developments in East Asia is that – at the overtly 
political, intra-regional level, at least - such developments are of relatively recent 
origin and reflect evolving processes, the outcome of which is inherently uncertain. 
The intention of this paper is initially to make some suggestions about how different 
regional experiences can be conceptualised and then to consider the factors that will 
determine the course of such developments in East Asia. 
 
Consequently, the paper is organised in the following way: firstly, I consider some of 
the more useful and important theoretical insights that have been generated in order to 
explain regional processes. Secondly, I briefly examine some of the distinctive and 
specific historical factors that have shaped political, economic and strategic 
developments in East Asia, as these provide both the bedrock for, and a potential 
constraint upon, contemporary regional initiatives. Finally, I look more closely at the 
evolving nature of regional processes in East Asia generally and at the ASEAN Plus 
Three initiative in particular. The central argument that I advance is that regional 
initiatives in East Asia have been driven and constrained by a complex array of 
contingent internal factors and powerful external influences in surprising and 
unpredictable ways. The influence of the US has, I contend, been extremely important 
in this regard, and its direct and indirect interventions in East Asia look likely to 
continue defining the overall context within which East Asian regional processes 
unfold. As a consequence, East Asia has been characterised by a form of ‘reactionary 
regionalism’, in which regional initiatives have frequently been both a response to 
external events and designed to mediate and moderate their impact. 
 
  
East Asia Regionalisation in Historical and Theoretical Perspective 
 
The terms regionalism and regionalisation are frequently used more or less inter-
changeably, but it is helpful to make a distinction between the two. Many analysts of 
regional processes distinguish between those processes that are the largely 
uncoordinated consequence of private-sector led economic integration – 
regionalisation – on the one hand, and those processes of regionally-based 
cooperation and coordination that are the self-consciously driven consequences of 
political activities – regionalism – on the other.2 This is a useful distinction because it 
serves as an important point of comparison and explanation both within individual 
regions, and between regions in different parts of the world. As we shall see, ‘East 
Asia’ has, until fairly recently, at least, been marked primarily by process of 
regionalisation in which external economic forces have played a major role in 
encouraging integration. Regionalism, or formal political initiatives and agreements, 
has tended to follow in their wake – a quite different experience in some important 
ways from that of Europe. To understand the very different sorts of outcomes that 
have distinguished regional processes in East Asia from Europe or Latin America, it is 
necessary to put the region’s development in its specific historical context. 
 
At the outset, it is worth making a few elementary comparative historical points as 
they remain important and help us to account for the different development 
experiences and challenges that characterise the contemporary international political 
economy. In this regard, it is important to emphasise that, the remarkable economic 
transformation that has occurred in much of East Asia notwithstanding, much of the 
region continues to confront the particular challenges of ‘late’ development and the 
specific constraints that implies. The historical expansion of capitalism from Western 
Europe and latterly the United States not only conferred significant ‘first mover’ 
advantages on those regions and/or countries but - as an inevitable corollary of this 
process - they also placed major structurally embedded development hurdles in the 
path of the countries of East Asia. 3 
 
To accelerate the pace of development in a world already dominated by established 
industrial powers, East Asia generally and Japan in particular famously pioneered the 
‘developmental state’, in which national governments guided the course of 
development with the help of an array of what were generally highly effective policy 
tools. The story of the region’s remarkable economic expansion and the sequential 
development process that moved from Japan, through South Korea and Taiwan, and 
into Southeast Asia and latterly China, is well enough known to need little rehearsal 
here.4 There are, however, a number of features of this historical legacy that merit 
emphasis as they continue to shape the region’s contemporary development 
experience, the domestic political-economies of the region, as well as the region’s 
relationships with other parts of the world. 
 
War and peace in East Asia 
 
One of the defining aspects of the East Asian experience has been the region’s 
incorporation into the Cold War security architecture that dominated the international 
scene for over four decades following World War II. In this context the US, 
unambiguously revealed in the war’s aftermath as the dominant power of the era, 
played a critical role. Whereas in Western Europe, American hegemony was 
instrumental in promoting closer European integration as a response to the apparent 
threat of communist expansion,5 in East Asia, the US’s preference for a series of  ‘hub 
and spoke’ bilateral relations with its allies on the one hand, and its implacable 
hostility to communist rivals on the other, had the effect of fracturing the region and 
making any kind of region wide integration or identity impossible.6 For those nations 
fortunate enough to be on the ‘right’ side, however, the Cold War offered the prospect 
of accelerated development via direct American aid, and a tolerant attitude to political 
practices and economic relationships of which US policymakers might not otherwise 
have approved.  
 
The continuing ‘War on Terror’ is, therefore, but the latest in a long line of regional 
strategic crises that have had their origins in wider external conflicts, but which have 
had a major impact on East Asia’s development and sense of regional identity. It is 
important to note that the very idea of a distinct Southeast Asian region, which 
ultimately provided a basis for the original ASEAN grouping and the subsequent 
ASEAN Plus Three initiative, was itself an artefact of British military planning during 
World War II.7  Indeed, as Charrier has persuasively argued, 8 ASEAN did not so 
much create a Southeast Asian political space through its actions, as ‘indigenise’ an 
existing one that had been given de facto expression by the activities of the colonial 
powers. Similarly, the crucial impact of the Cold War period was to entrench external 
influences by dividing the East Asian region along ideological lines. Consequently, 
not only was there little possibility of extensive, intra-regional relations developing 
across East Asia as a whole, but even where greater regional cooperation occurred, it 
was limited and reactive. The inauguration of ASEAN itself, for example, may have 
been largely motivated by a desire to contain and institutionalise otherwise brittle 
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia,9 but its membership and goals were 
constrained by the overarching reality of the wider conflict between the major powers: 
the Soviet Union, the US and East Asia’s emergent great power, China. 
 
The ending of the Cold War appeared to open up new opportunities for intra-regional 
cooperation and confidence building in East Asia. Yet there are still major potential 
constraints on what can be achieved – an underlying reality given renewed 
prominence by recent events and the US’s direct strategic intervention in the region. 
Most fundamentally, perhaps, the predominantly bilateral security architecture 
established by the US in East Asia during the Cold War shows little sign of shifting to 
a more multilateral structure, the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
notwithstanding. For as Simon notes,10 the ARF contained the same sorts of inherent 
tensions between the activist, legalistic ‘Westerners’ and the more consensually-
minded East Asians as APEC did. Indeed, it is revealing that both the US and 
Australia have endorsed the doctrine of pre-emption in responding to the threat of 
terrorism, rather than attempting to work through more multilateral channels.  The 
US’s rather heavy-handed interventions in Indonesia, the Philippines and on the 
Korean peninsular, despite the problems this has created for the respective 
governments of these countries, serves as a powerful reminder of the extent of US 
power and the limitations of regional cooperation.11 
 
A number of points merit emphasis from this very brief consideration of East Asia’s 
overall security situation. First, recent events serve as powerful reminders of the 
enduring strategic tensions in the region. Second, and flowing directly from the first 
point, the possibilities for regional cooperation will be constrained by strategic 
concerns, especially the role of the US in the region. It is important to emphasise that 
for all the US’s sometimes overbearing and insensitive behaviour, most of the region 
– China is the obvious exception – continues to give rhetorical support for and desire 
American engagement; the potential impact of an American withdrawal on the 
regional balance of power, especially between Japan and China, is still a major 
constraint on the region’s ability to act independently of the US.12 There are a number 
of unresolved strategic tensions in the region, most obviously revolving around 
China’s strategic ambitions and its claims for the Spartly Islands, the continuing 
stand-off on the Korean peninsular, to say nothing of a number of other disputes 
between the ASEAN countries,13 which mean that America is seen by many regional 
players as a decisive and stabilising influence. In such circumstances, the degree of 
autonomy available to individual countries is highly constrained, and the possibility of 
developing an encompassing East Asia perspective that differs markedly from the 
US's goals is reduced as a consequence. 
 
Consequently, the final point to emphasise is that in the seemingly likely event that 
strategic concerns generally, and the ‘war on terror’ in particular, remain prominent 
parts of intra- and inter-regional relations, then the US and its actions will continue to 
be pivotal constraints on the course of regional development. If the US continues a 
shift from a benevolent form of hegemony in which it enjoys broad support for 
enlightened policies and the provision of important collective goods, to a more 
coercive form of hegemony in which America unilaterally pursues its own narrow 
national interests with or without widespread support, it will present a major 
challenge to East Asia.14 Having said that, it is also becoming increasingly apparent 
that American policy is effectively alienating, or at the very least, making life 
extraordinarily difficult for formerly stalwart allies. The new South Korea 
government of Roh Moo Hyun for example, initially expressed popularly supported 
criticisms of American policy that were seen to be destabilising relations with the 
North, before opting to send troops to take part in post-war reconstruction in Iraq.15 
Likewise in Indonesia and the Philippines, there has been widespread unease about 
America’s rather heavy-handed interventions in regional affairs, something that has 
effectively undermined ASEAN solidarity.16 Even in Japan, the population has been 
sufficiently unnerved by some of the apparent consequences of American policy to 
spark an important debate about the nature of Japan’s own policies as a consequence. 
Thus far there has been little attempt to develop a regional response to recent events, 
and given the disparate national interests and impacts of such events, it is not clear 
what such a policy would look like. However, if the ‘war on terror’ goes badly, and if 
East Asia is generally seen to be damaged by events over which it has little control, 
then it is not inconceivable that a new, more inclusive calculus of the region’s 
strategic interests may emerge. 
 
 
US hegemony and East Asian political-economy 
 
The evolution of, and prospects for, emergent institutions like ASEAN Plus Three 
will be shaped both by these enduring political and economic historical realities, and 
by the way that the East Asian region more generally is incorporated into a wider 
international order. In addition to the strategic constraints and pressures noted above, 
East Asia must contend with the challenge of integration into the increasingly 
pervasive and interconnected international political-economy. It is important to 
emphasise that this is a system dominated by America and its institutional allies, 
because some of the most influential accounts of the new regionalism are predicated 
upon assumptions about the supposed decline of American hegemony.17 In such 
conceptions, America’s waning influence opens up a space for new centres of power 
to emerge, centres which, following the EU exemplar, are more likely to assume a 
regional rather than a national focus. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the ‘declinist’ 
view of American power was prominent during the 1980s when East Asia’s general 
stellar economic performance eclipsed the US’s and gave rise to concerns about 
‘imperial overstretch’ and the end of American pre-eminence.18 Despite the fact that 
there are still grounds for remaining sceptical about the overall health of the American 
economy,19 the status of the US in the international system has been transformed, 
leading to triumphalist predictions of a second American century,20 and further 
constraining East Asia’s reactionary regionalism. 
 
Clearly, there is a good deal of uncertainty about the extent and intent of American 
power at present, and there is no intention of attempting to provide an exhaustive 
account of US-East Asia relations here.21 However, the US’s dominant and 
increasingly assertive position, especially but not exclusively in the strategic sphere, 
means that the development of East Asian regionalism cannot be understood without 
some reference to American power. The key point to emphasise here is that 
assumptions about the supposed decline of American power – the anaemic recent 
performance of the American economy notwithstanding – look overstated and 
premature.22 The US has long used its dominant position in the emergent architecture 
of global governance it helped to create and maintain to promote a market-centred, 
neoliberal reform agenda that was fundamentally at odds with the sort of state-
dominated economic orders that prevailed in East Asia. While there may be some 
debate about how successfully these normative and ideational aspects of American 
hegemony have been inculcated throughout the East Asia and elsewhere,23 the key 
consideration as far as East Asia is concerned is that America’s reformist goals have 
been supported by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and have consequently 
had the effect of  accelerating structural change in the developmental states of the 
region.24 
 
The potential implications of neoliberal reform for the states of East Asia cannot be 
overstated. In a series of original and important articles, Kanishka Jayasuriya has 
demonstrated that the distinctive political-economies of the region are being steadily 
transformed as the region’s overall integration into the wider international system 
evolves. 25 What he describes as the ‘embedded mercantilist’ regimes of the region, 26 
in which powerful, domestically-oriented political and economic coalitions have been 
able to use their influence to create and sustain policies that protect them from 
external competition, have been increasingly undermined by policy initiatives 
designed to promote economic openness and competition. Significantly, as Jayasuriya 
points out, such regimes were not directly threatened by the sort of ‘open regionalism’ 
that predominated under the auspices of institutions like the Asia Pacific Economic 
(APEC) forum, where trade liberalisation was ultimately a unilaterally determined 
process, and where states retained the possibility of making side deals with adversely 
affected, but influential domestic coalitions. In the post-crisis environment, however, 
in which the US has played a much more assertive role, the ability of states to 
maintain this bargain has diminished. Not only have the overall capacities of states 
been eroded by a combination of structural changes that have undermined formerly 
powerful policy tools,27 and widespread ideological support for ‘appropriate’ reform, 
but the re-emergence of security concerns have further constrained regional autonomy 
and made the development of a unified regional position more complex.  
 
The combination of state intervention, authoritarian rule and the attempted cultivation 
of a domestic capitalist class that was capable of taking on or – more often – 
domestically supplanting established transnational capital, had the effect of 
entrenching indigenous political and economic elites and institutionalising particular 
forms of rule or governance. Such institutionalised relations are not only ‘sticky’ and 
thus resistant to rapid reform, but they also delimit the range of possible social 
practices or relationships that are feasible in particular circumstances.28 Two further 
points flow from this: firstly, there has always been a potential for in-built resistance 
to the sort of neoliberal reforms that have latterly been championed by the US in 
particular and by international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund more generally – something that helps to account for the 
often fractious relationship between the US and the region. Secondly, even if the East 
Asian governments had been enthusiastic about the prospect of neoliberal reform – 
which they frequently were not – there are limits to their ability to implement them.29 
A key factor behind the successful development of a single market, the establishment 
of a common currency and the more generalised process of deeper political 
integration and sovereignty pooling that has distinguished the EU has been the 
existence of a ‘thick’ infrastructure of non-state institutions and actors that were 
capable of facilitating new forms of increasingly market-centred governance.30 In East 
Asia, by contrast, in the absence of a similarly developed non-state sector or civil 
society, the state has of necessity been a more prominent actor. 
 
The distinctive role of the state and the highly politicised nature of business activities 
across much of the region not only distinguish East Asia economies from those in 
other parts of the world,31 but they present a potentially significant point of friction 
between the region and key external actors like the US and the IFIs. In such 
circumstances, an effective regional organisation that contains the largest economies 
of the region, and which has the capacity and desire to promote indigenous strategies 
with which to accommodate global processes, is potentially highly attractive. It is 
precisely such a role that ASEAN Plus Three could fill; whether it will realise its 
potential is dependent on a complex mix of internal and external factors.  
 
 
ASEAN Plus Three: Its Antecedents and Prospects 
 
In this section I examine the forces that have encouraged the development of the 
nascent ASEAN Plus Three grouping, which includes the much larger economies of 
Japan, China and South Korea in addition to the ten ASEAN members. The picture 
that emerges is complex, uncertain and rapidly evolving, but one tentative conclusion 
appears plausible: formerly quiescent strategic considerations, the absence of which 
allowed a greater degree of autonomy to develop within East Asia, have resurfaced 
and look set to play an important role in shaping and delimiting the possible trajectory 
of East Asian regionalism. A further caveat needs to be added to this claim: the 
impact of strategic considerations is itself potentially contradictory and will ultimately 
depend on a number of imponderable strategic developments – especially those 
revolving around American foreign policy - and the region’s capacity to develop 
collective responses to them. At this stage, all we can do is spell out some of the 
potential contradictory dynamics that are likely to underpin future developments and 
link them to the region’s specific historical circumstances. 
 
Regional factors 
 
The most important antecedent of ASEAN Plus Three is, of course, ASEAN itself. 
Although ASEAN has provided an important foundation for the development of a 
wider East Asian grouping, there are some important differences in the formative 
dynamics of both groupings that merit brief emphasis. ASEAN, as noted earlier, was 
very much a product of the aftermath of the decolonisation process, the Cold War, and 
the great power contestation that continues to grip the region. Regionalisation – or the 
private sector-driven economic integration manifest in denser trade and investment 
flows - was not a decisive force in encouraging closer political cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. On the contrary, intra-regional trade is still modest between the non-
complementary and essentially competitive economies in most of ASEAN.32 It is 
important to remember that ASEAN is composed of a number of small economies, the 
structure and development of which has been profoundly shaped by firstly 
colonialism and latterly by the activities of more powerful economic and political 
forces from outside Southeast Asia.33 In other words, there have been integrative 
forces encouraging economic regionalisation, but these have emanated from countries 
like Japan,34 which are outside the smaller ASEAN grouping and are an expression of 
wider East Asian forces. At the level of regionalisation, therefore, an expanded 
ASEAN Plus Three grouping that takes account of such pan-regional forces makes 
intuitive sense. 
 
Yet one of the distinguishing characteristics of East Asian regionalisation is that it is 
relatively low profile. Of the three major drivers of economic integration identified by 
Dajin Peng35– regional production networks, ethnic business networks, and 
subregional economic zones – none has the sort visibility associated with initiatives 
like the creation of a single market in the EU. However, this ‘informal’ style of 
integration has provided a rationale for a more explicit political corollary as the 
countries of Southeast and Northeast Asia come to recognise that their economic 
interests may be advanced through enhanced regional cooperation. The underlying 
logic of the broader East Asian region’s multi-tiered developmental experience, in 
which Japan pioneered an industrialisation process that spread initially to South 
Korea, Taiwan, and then onto Southeast Asia and China, has led to a flurry of 
initiatives designed to consolidate regional integration. The ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), for example, reflected Southeast Asia’s incorporation into region-wide 
production networks.36 More recently, both Japan and China have moved to 
consolidate their economic relations with Southeast Asia through bilateral trade 
agreements.37  
 
Plainly, competition rather than cooperation between Japan and China - as they 
attempt to realise their respective regional leadership ambitions - may have a good 
deal to do with such initiatives.38 However, the attempt to enhance regional autonomy 
by institutionalising and increasing intra-regional trade and investment is also a 
reflection of a more fundamental and enduring reality: the East Asian crisis and its 
aftermath dramatically brought home to East Asia’s political and economic elites just 
how dependent they are on external markets and how vulnerable they are to outside 
political pressures. The crisis was consequently a watershed at a number of levels and 
led to a number of crucial political and economic initiatives that have given impetus 
to the ASEAN Plus Three project. 
 
The crisis and its aftermath 
 
The economic and political crises that struck East Asia generally and South Korea, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia in particular toward the end of 1997, have been 
sufficiently analysed now to need little elaboration here.39 There are, however, a 
number of aspects of the crisis that have accelerated and helped determine the 
subsequent course of regionalism in East Asia which are important to highlight. 
 
Perhaps the most significant long-term impact of the crisis was to fundamentally 
transform established perceptions of the region itself. On the one hand, this was 
manifest in the panic-stricken exit of mobile capital from the region, as a number of 
key countries went from being ‘pin-ups’ to ‘pariahs’ in a matter of months as far as 
the ‘international investment community’ was concerned. A handful of emerging 
market fund mangers, who controlled vast amounts of mobile capital, were 
instrumental in initially reinforcing and then puncturing the myth of the ‘Asian 
miracle’. On the other hand, this transformation in external perceptions fed into a 
painful but ultimately overdue internal reassessment of the costs, benefits and basis of 
integration into a global economy in which rapid capital movements were not only 
frequently of a vastly greater scale than individual national economies, but which 
were inherently unpredictable and destabilising.  
 
Two crucial sets of questions emerged from the crisis which have been central 
components of subsequent debates about the course and content of East Asian 
regional integration as a consequence: first, on what basis should the countries of East 
Asia be economically integrated into the wider global economy? Is it possible for East 
Asia to develop regulatory mechanisms that might insulate their distinctive forms of 
state-led economic organisation from the undesirable economic and political impacts 
of participation in the global political economy, while allowing them to take 
advantage of its benefits? Second, is it possible to create a regional political 
architecture which would allow regional elites to promote their preferred visions of 
transnational cooperation whilst simultaneously preserving regional autonomy? This 
latter question is crucial because one of the most remarkable and revealing after 
aspects of the crisis was the way it was managed: not only were external actors like 
the IMF and the US Treasury Department the most prominent players in crisis 
management, but they took the opportunity to push for precisely the sorts of 
neoliberal reforms they had championed for years to little avail prior to the crisis 
itself. In other words, the crisis revealed both the continuing vulnerability of the 
region as a whole to external leverage and the lack of a regional capacity to manage 
such events. 
 
Consolidation or conflict? 
 
It is important to emphasise that the idea of a specifically East Asian grouping to 
represent the possible collective interests of the region is not new or something 
exclusively associated with the crisis and its aftermath. On the contrary, Malaysian 
Prime Minster Mahathir Mohamed has long called for the establishment of such an 
organisation. Significantly, however, Mahathir’s proposed grouping, the East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), was frustrated by a combination of US opposition and a 
directly consequential Japanese ambivalence.40 Equally significantly, ASEAN Plus 
Three has continued to develop momentum despite the fact that it is essentially 
Mahathir’s vision in another guise. 
 
In some ways this should come as no surprise: despite the frequently noted diversity 
of the East Asian region, Stubbs argues that there are a number of commonalities – 
the experience of warfare, ‘Asian values’, common institutions, a distinctive brand of 
capitalism, and deeper economic integration – which provide ASEAN Plus Three with 
a potential basis for regional identity and consolidation.41 Moreover, the members of 
ASEAN Plus Three had already begun to forge common perspectives through inter-
regional initiatives like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Indeed, the fact that such 
an exclusively East Asian grouping appeared a more ‘natural’ expression of an 
identifiable region reveals how misconceived those analyses which continue to focus 
on a wider ‘Asia-Pacific regionalism’ actually are.42 One of the principal reasons that 
APEC has failed to fulfil the hopes of its supporters has been its inability to 
accommodate and represent the very different ‘Asian’ and ‘Western’ impulses 
contained within it.43 The key question for ASEAN Plus Three is whether the sorts of 
initiatives it has undertaken will be able to build more successfully on its putative 
regional identity. 
 In this context, it is revealing that some of the more significant initiatives undertaken 
within broadly ASEAN Plus Three auspices have been of a fairly technocratic nature. 
Nevertheless, there is much at stake for both intra- and inter-regional relations, as the 
US’s effective veto of Japan’s original proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
demonstrates.44 This rather heavy-handed intervention in the region’s affairs might 
have been read as an example of an emergent, more coercive form of hegemony, 
designed to impose neoliberal reform on a part of the world associated with very 
different patterns of economic organisation.45 Revealingly, however, it seems that 
AMF-style initiatives are not being held up so much by a lack of regional economic 
capacity, but by doubts on the part of those that might be called on to underwrite such 
a scheme.46 In this context, China and Japan’s accession to IMF conditionality for any 
future currency swap arrangements are emblematic of a more pervasive and diffuse 
form of hegemony in which the interests of financial capital have become increasingly 
influential, placing major limitations on the precise nature of any distinctive regional 
response to financial sector reform. 
 
 
To understand this possible obstacle to the development of an encompassing regional 
policy position, and the inherent conflict of interest between the region’s wealthier 
and poorer countries it reveals, we need to distinguish between the financial and ‘real’ 
economies. Global finance is the area of international economic activity that has gone 
furthest in becoming footloose, stateless and increasingly geared to a transnational 
regulatory framework.47 Revealingly, and despite the clear evidence about both the 
impact that highly mobile capital flows have had in precipitating and intensifying the 
East Asian crisis, there has been little serious attempt to curb such initiatives or 
establish different, specifically East Asia regulatory regimes.48 True, there are 
formidable technical obstacles that make establishing currency swap arrangement 
difficult,49 particularly given the lack of governmental capacity amongst some of 
Southeast Asia’s less developed countries,50 but there would seem to be a more basic 
alignment of interests across the international financial sector that makes regional 
solidarity inherently problematic. In this regard, the Chiang Mai initiative of 2000, 
which was designed to promote regional financial crisis management, may have had a 
‘symbolic importance [that] is hard to overestimate’,51 but thus far, it has been of little 
practical significance. 
 
At the level of the real economy, however, where the distinctive structure of East 
Asian business and the close links between economic and political elites makes 
reform more visible, direct and potentially painful, resistance to change is more 
pronounced and the incentives for regional cooperation to protect broadly similar 
regional political and economic structures may be greater. The outbreak of intra-
regional trade agreements, which have the capacity to accommodate powerful 
domestic constituencies, becomes easier to understand in this context. Moreover, as 
Ravenhill notes,52 preferential trade agreements may have symbolic importance that 
goes beyond their economic worth as they help to consolidate underlying regional 
relations. The way such contradictory sectoral and national tensions may work 
themselves out can be seen in the case of Japan: although the financial sector has been 
increasingly liberalised – often despite, rather than as a consequence of, the wishes of 
Japanese officials – the government has shown an ability to maintain a degree of 
insulation for a number of politically powerful constituencies in the real economy 
through an array of restrictive trade agreements.53 However, the fact that these trade 
initiatives are happening predominantly at the bilateral level, or have been bolted on 
to existing structures like AFTA, suggests that there are still major obstacles to the 
development of region-wide agreements of a sort that will given greater credibility to 
ASEAN Plus Three. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Given the number of political, economic, and strategic variables currently in play, it is 
wise to keep in mind Yogi Berra’s sage advice about the dangers of prediction – 
especially about the future. However, it is possible to identify key dynamics that are 
likely to shape regional outcomes and extrapolate from existent trends. 
 
The first general observation to make about ASEAN Plus Three is that, like other 
regional organisations such as APEC and the narrower ASEAN grouping, it promises 
much, but has arguably delivered relatively little so far. Like ASEAN and APEC, 
ASEAN Plus Three is displaying signs of institutional consolidation, and has spawned 
a plethora of Summits, Senior Officials Meetings, and working groups in areas such 
as finance and trade, political and strategic cooperation, as well as energy and 
environmental cooperation. 54 Such initiatives clearly help to give institutional ballast 
to the region, build confidence and identity, and may ultimately prove to be important 
parts of an effective regional institutional infrastructure. At present, however, they are 
more reminiscent of the, possibly well-intentioned, efforts of APEC to promote 
economic reform and facilitate integration through the establishment of functionally-
oriented working groups and the like. Like APEC, ASEAN Plus Three’s adherence to 
the ‘ASEAN way’ of consensus and voluntarism,55 and lingering concerns about 
establishing a powerful secretariat that might ultimately threaten national autonomy is 
also likely to make the development of effective and binding regional initiatives much 
more difficult. 
 
This leads to a second consideration: East Asia’s diversity makes cooperation 
inherently more complex and challenging than it does in the EU, for example, where 
similar levels of economic development and integration into regional and international 
systems give rise to potentially similar interests. In East Asia, by contrast, not only are 
there profoundly different levels of development, modes of governance and 
potentially disparate policy perspectives as a consequence, but the regional mega-
economies of Japan and China are also integrated into the global economy in ways 
that make the identification, let alone the implementation of common policy positions 
inherently problematic. This is not to say that there are not important historical forces 
that might encourage greater regional economic and even political cooperation; 
plainly, there are. But whether the desire for a greater sense of regional identity can 
overcome the different policy positions that fundamentally different economic 
structures generate, to say nothing of overcoming the long-standing regional rivalries 
that exist between Japan and China, is a moot point. A third, and arguably most 
significant potential influence on the course of East Asian development emanates 
from outside the region.  
 
The US – directly or indirectly – continues to exert a critical influence on East Asian 
regional development. Significantly, the effect of American influence appears to vary 
across issue areas: while America’s intervention in the region’s post-crisis 
development had the effect of accelerating the process of regional political and 
economic cooperation, the US’s ‘war on terror’ has revealed deep fault-lines across 
the region as individual country’s most fundamental interests and policies are 
subjected to searching examinations and pressure. In such circumstances it has proved 
impossible to develop a region-wide response to American actions. The strategic 
bilateralism that characterised the Cold War era continues to influence national 
responses and constrain regional initiatives; the only question is whether such 
constraints will ultimately spill-over into the economic sphere and make even that 
aspect of regional integration less feasible. In the short-term, at least, it seems safe to 
predict that the trajectory of East Asian regionalism will continue to be profoundly 
influenced by American actions and essentially reactive as a consequence. 
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